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Industrial associations as a channel of business-government interactions 
in imperfect institutional environment: the Russian case 
 
 
By Andrei Yakovlev1 and Andrei Govorun2 
 
 
 
Abstract: International lessons from emerging economies suggest that business associations may 
provide an effective channel of communication between the government and the private sector. This 
function of business associations may become still more important in transition economies, where old 
mechanisms for coordination of enterprise activities have been destroyed, but the new ones have not been 
established yet. In this context, Russian experience is a matter of interest, because Russia was regarded for 
a long time as a striking example of state failures and market failures. Consequently, the key point of our 
study was a description of the role and place of business associations in the present-day Russian economy 
and their interaction with member companies and bodies of state administration. 
Relying on the survey data of 957 manufacturing firms, conducted in 2009 we found that business 
associations are more frequently joined by larger companies, firms located in regional capital cities, and 
firms active in investment and innovation. By contrast, business associations tend to be less frequently 
joined by business groups’ subsidiaries and firms that were non-responsive about their respective 
ownership structures. Our regression analysis has also confirmed that business associations are a 
component of what Frye (2002) calls an “elite exchange”– although only on regional and local levels. 
These “exchanges” imply that members of business associations, on the one hand, more actively assist 
regional and local authorities in social development of their regions, and on the other hand, they more often 
receive support from authorities. However, this effect is insignificant in terms of support from the federal 
government.  
In general, our results allow us to believe that at present, business associations (especially the 
industry-wide and “leading” ones) consolidate the most active, advanced companies and act as collective 
representatives of their interests. For this reason, business associations can be regarded as interface units 
between the authorities and businesses and as a possible instrument for promotion of economic 
development. 
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1. Introduction.3 
 
International lessons from emerging economies suggest that business associations may provide 
an effective channel of communication between the government and the private sector (Doner & 
Schneider, 2000; Locke, 2001). This function of business associations may become still more important 
in transition economies, where old mechanisms for coordination of enterprise activities have been 
destroyed, but the new ones have not been established yet (Recanatini & Ryterman, 2001). In this 
context, Russian experience is a matter of interest, because Russia was regarded for a long time as a 
striking example of state failures and market failures (Stiglitz, 1999). 
Consequently, the key point of our study was a description of the role and place of business 
associations in the present-day Russian economy and their interaction with member companies and 
bodies of state administration. Within the framework of this general objective, we set a number of 
specific goals. 
First, we wanted to estimate the scale of enterprise membership in business associations in 
Russia. Such estimates were made in some previous empirical studies, but practically all of them were 
based on the data of the early and mid-2000s. However, we wanted to understand how these quantitative 
parameters had changed after the Yukos case (which made a strong impact on relations between 
business and government), and how they were affected by the economic crisis of 2008-2009.  
Second, we wanted to understand what factors influence membership in associations. Here, we 
mean objective circumstances, such as size of a firm, its ownership form, the period of its establishment, 
its belonging to a holding group and firm’s location, and characteristics of its behavior, including its 
activities in exports, capital investment and innovations. 
Third, we gave special attention to the set of relations of enterprises with administration at the 
federal, regional and local levels and to the role of business associations in this field. We considered not 
only different types of support that the firms receive from government but also “counter flows” of social 
development aid in the regions that the firms give to local and regional authorities. 
To achieve of these three goals, we relied on the survey data of 957 manufacturing firms, 
conducted in 2009 by the Institute for Industrial and Market Studies of the Higher School of Economics 
on order of the Ministry of Economic Development. Subsequently, in the spring of 2010, we undertook 
a series of in-depth qualitative interviews with heads of business associations of various types.  
An analysis of the collected data revealed that the proportion of business association members is 
close to 40% in manufacturing, while over a half of member firms perceive their business association 
membership to be useful. Regression analysis suggests that business associations are more frequently 
joined by larger companies, firms located in regional capital cities, and firms active in investment and 
innovation. By contrast, business associations tend to be less frequently joined by business groups’ 
subsidiaries and firms that were non-responsive about their respective ownership structures. 
Business associations are a link in the framework of government-business exchanges, primarily 
at the regional and local levels. Indeed, business association members are more active in assisting 
regional and local authorities in the social development of their regions and, at the same time, receive 
government support more frequently. However, firm participation in business associations proved 
insignificant for federal support.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the existing literature on the role of 
business associations in economic development. Section 3 briefly describes recent developments and 
                                                          
3 This paper is based on the results of a research project carried out at the HSE Institute for Industrial and Market Studies and 
supported by the Program of fundamental studies of Higher School of Economics and research grant of Moscow Public 
Science Foundation.  Authors are grateful to their colleagues at the Institute for Industrial and Market Studies, Victoria 
Golikova, Alexei Zudin, Nadezhda Goreiko and Ekaterina Astafieva as well as to William Pyle from Middlebury College for 
useful discussions during implementation on this project. Special thanks are also due to all the respondents who agreed to 
take part in the survey and provide company information. 
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key trends in the sector of business associations in Russia, while Section 4 reviews earlier empirical 
research in this area. Section 5 presents data sources used in our analysis. Section 6 evaluates the rates 
of firm participation in business associations and describes member firms’ characteristics. Section 7 puts 
forth key hypotheses and explains the methodology of econometric analysis, while Section 8 presents 
the results. Finally, Section 9 sums up the key conclusions of the study. 
 
2. Business associations’ impact on economic development: review of previous studies  
 
It may be noteworthy that for many years, research literature in this area has been dominated by 
negative presumptions against business associations, following the well-known books by Mancur Olson 
(Olson, 1965 & 1982). This skepticism was based on Olson’s argument that businessmen collectively 
pursue their private (special) interests and cannot create public goods, and interest groups entrenched in 
national economies give rise to institutional sclerosis, detrimental to economic performance and 
growth.4 These assumptions are in many respects supported by numerous further studies. (A review of 
approximately 50 empirical studies published during the 25 years following the publication of The Rise 
and Decline of Nations is provided in Heckelman (2007).)  
However, there are differences observed in business associations’ impact in countries of varying 
levels of development. Indeed, an empirical analysis in Coates and Heckelman (2003) demonstrates that 
in OECD countries, the interest group activity (measured by the number of business associations 
included in the World Guide to Trade Associations) has adverse implications for investment. 
Alternatively, in non-OECD countries, this correlation is positive, albeit with low significance.5  
These conclusions are consistent with the findings of some qualitative studies. Drawing on a 
series of case studies in emerging economies, Doner and Schneider (2000) show that in an environment 
of imperfect government institutions, business associations may serve the government as a feedback 
mechanism in its interaction with business, and as a source of information about property rights 
violations and business barriers. In this case, Doner and  Schneider define an association as a ‘market-
supporting institution.’ Moreover, business associations may produce public goods when the economy 
lacks a developed market infrastructure. In this case, business associations may collect and share with 
government authorities and economic agents specific market information, ensure inter-firm coordination 
in the development and maintenance of sector standards, and facilitate local firm entry to new markets 
(including external markets) and implementation of new technologies. In this context, the association 
may be viewed as a ‘market-supplementing institution.’ 
However, by no means can all business associations perform these functions: only those 
compliant with certain requirements can. Specifically, Doner and  Schneider note that effective business 
associations performing public utility functions tend to appear in sectors where firms are exposed to 
stronger competitive pressures (primarily, external), driving them to collective action. They should also 
have adequate institutional strength, based on high member density in the sector, effective mediation of 
member interests and skilled, competent staff members. However, the institutional strength of existing 
associations largely depends on selective incentives that such associations may provide to their 
members, due to certain powers delegated to them by the government. Such selective benefits may 
include access (via the association) to international trade negotiations, influence on legal regulations and 
setting sector standards, distribution of export quotas, export licenses, government contracts and training 
programs. 
Constraints on economic growth in developing countries traditionally include strong distrust of 
firms in each other and in government policies. This distrust results in higher risks of new business 
                                                          
4 Institutional sclerosis is the term used in literature to describe situations in which entrenched interest groups and institutions 
representing them block entry of new players and resist structural change, for example. 
5 Different effects produced by business association activities in advanced and developing economies were also noted in a 
more recent study by Coates, Heckelman and Wilson (2010). 
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projects and weaker investment activity of firms. However, as Richard Locke demonstrated by cases 
from Brazil and southern Italy (Locke, 2001), even against the backdrop of highly imperfect markets 
and government institutions (including rampant corruption and rent-seeking), business associations may 
evolve as mechanisms of coordination, facilitating mutual understanding between firms and the 
government, building trust and boosting economic development. In general, studies of “new industrial 
policy” (Rodrik, 2004 and 2008; Hausmann et al., 2008) especially underscore the need for cooperation 
of business with government for elimination of market failures in transitional economies. 
It is of note that a number of advanced economies have shown in recent years that business 
associations may emerge as agents that create not only private and club goods but also public goods. 
Australia, for example, has been widely practicing Industry Action Agendas since the early 2000s. 
Industry Action Agendas are implemented under the auspices of relevant sector ministries with wide the 
participation of sector business associations.6 A review of outcomes produced by using these new 
approaches to Australia’s pharmaceutical industry relations is provided in (Morgan et al (2008). 
 
3. Institutional context: main trends in business associations development in Russia 
 
Membership is voluntary in Russian business associations. The framework of business 
associations was built in several stages. Business associations were initially developed when the central 
planning system collapsed in the late 1980s. In the context of increasingly tighter resources and overall 
economic destabilization, “directors’ clubs” developed into places for enterprise heads to exchange 
information and independently find suppliers and buyers. In 1990, the government attempted to take 
control of this spontaneous process of cooperation, establishing the Science and Industry Union of the 
USSR (subsequently renamed the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs – RSPP), the 
Association of Young Enterprise Leaders and some others.  
As the centrally planned economy was dismantled in 1992, ex-sector ministries were used as 
foundations to build business associations. For example, in 1992, an International Union of Steelworkers 
was established, with the last metallurgy minister of the USSR Sergey Kolpakov as its head. It is 
noteworthy that associations came to life not only for sectors but also for regions. In the latter case, they 
were intended to support contact and interaction with regional and local authorities. Some associations 
were specifically established to pursue political agendas. An example of this kind of association is the 
All-Russian Association of Privatized and Private Enterprises, set up in 1993 by party activists of the 
Democratic Choice of Russia.   
The Russian Chamber of Commerce and Industry (TPP) has played a special role in the 
framework of business associations and its regional affiliates. The TPP case is exceptional because TPP 
has a special legal status, according to the Law on the Chambers of 1993, and a kind of monopolistic 
entitlement to render certain services to enterprises, related to certification of goods for exports and 
imports. Many regional TPP branches established in the Soviet era have inherited assets. This made the 
chambers financially independent and ensured their “autonomy” from their members.  
Overall, Russian business associations in the 1990s were weakly organized and highly politicized. 
Meanwhile, the real influence of business groups on economic policy-making was weak, as larger 
enterprises preferred dealing directly with the government. This phenomenon was described in the 
literature as state capture (Hellman et al., 2000). 
The situation changed after 2000 (for more detail, see Zudin (2001, 2006)). As Putin’s government 
tried to distance itself from personal relationships with top business leaders in place since the 1990s, 
they focused their attention on arranging standing consultations with business communities through top 
                                                          
6 For example, see http://www.daff.gov.au/fisheries/aquaculture/agenda which describes the process and outcomes of the 
Fishing Industry Action Agenda implementation in 1999-2005; and http://www.wfa.org.au/WRAA.aspx regarding the new 
Wine Restructuring Action Agenda announced by the government and two leading business associations in the wine-making 
sector in 2009.  
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business associations. To this end, the presidential administration initiated a reorganization of the 
Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs. The earlier broad-based and loose Board dominated 
by old-time industrial directors (“red directors”) was replaced, with a Board Bureau as its central 
executive body. Owners of larger private business groups were invited to join the Board Bureau. In this 
way, the new RSPP was set up as a big business lobby. At the same time, OPORA Rossii and Delovay 
Rossia were established to lobby the interests of small and medium-sized businesses, respectively. The 
Russian Chamber of Commerce and Industry also shored up its position, as former Prime Minister 
Evgeny Primakov became its president. 
A specific feature of “peak” business associations is their closer proximity to authority, which is a 
distinctly important resource for efficient lobbying for members’ interests. These “peak” associations 
usually include the largest or the most active enterprises, but in general, they are organized as “unions of 
unions” and include industry-wide associations and regional branches in their membership. 
In 2000-2003, the top associations were included in deliberations on key economic policy issues, 
including tax reform, WTO accession and electricity sector reform. It should be noted that RSPP, as the 
big business lobby, was more visible and audible in this government-business dialogue.  
However, the Yukos case in 2003-2004 resulted in a heavy crisis in government-business relations 
(importantly, Yukos’ former president Mikhail Khodorkovsky had been a member of the RSPP Board 
Bureau since 2000, actively participating in discussions with government officials). The government 
stopped perceiving big business as an equal partner to be consulted on key economic policy decisions. 
At the same time, the Yukos case, being a striking example of selective discriminatory law enforcement, 
aggravated business distrust in government (for more details, see Yakovlev (2006)).  
Consequently, since the mid-2000s, government-business consultation has degraded in level but 
expanded in coverage, with a network of civil society and expert councils established under the federal 
agencies in 2005 and expanded contact with sector-specific associations initiated by some ministries. In 
particular, analysis of membership in non-government, advisory and expert councils of “economic 
profile,” created under the Presidential Administration of Russia, the Federal Government, ministries 
and agencies in the last decade, demonstrates the following pattern. Spokesmen of business were present 
in 115 out of 135 such associations, and in 96 cases (71% of all councils), they came from business 
associations. The “leading” associations more often take part in the work of deliberative bodies under 
the Government and federal ministries, while industry-level associations work in councils under federal 
services and agencies. 
Therefore, Russia has developed a two-tiered structure of business associations. The first, the 
upper tier, allowing interaction with top officials, included four top “peak” associations by the end of the 
2000s: RSPP, TPP, OPORA and Delovaya Rossia. The second tier includes numerous sector-specific 
and region-specific associations.  
Absent any regulation of the activities of business associations in Russia (except for the TPP 
law), it is difficult to offer any quantitative assessment of the size of the business associations sector. 
Some experts estimate that Russia has about 5,000 such associations. However, the number of 
operational associations is apparently smaller.  
In our view, the number of collective members of the top associations may be used as a proxy for 
the number of actual operating sectoral and regional associations. Indeed, as indicated earlier, the top 
associations are built as “unions of unions,” and members have to regularly pay their membership fees. 
For example, the RSPP membership fee for rank-and-file members is 150,000 rubles, or approximately 
US $5,000. Furthermore, unlike in the 1990s, associations now monitor and enforce timely payment of 
fees. Therefore, these costs would be justified only for those organizations that engage in their own core 
operations and receive meaningful benefits from their membership in top associations.  
An analysis of the collective membership data of the top three associations (RSPP, TPP and 
OPORA), available via the Internet, shows that they include approximately 300 sector-specific and 
regional business associations. However, this figure may rather indicate the lower boundary of the 
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number of active associations because, judging by our interviews, some smaller regional or sectoral 
associations with budgets of 1.5-2 million rubles a year may perceive these costs as unreasonable. 
Another source of quantitative assessments may be seen in the data produced by the survey of 
957 manufacturing firms administered by the Institute for Industrial and Market Studies (IIMS) in 2009. 
Respondents named about 300 various business associations in response to the following open-end 
question: “Are you (or other managers of your enterprise) members of any business association/union? 
If yes, what are these associations/unions?”7 Therefore, presumably, Russia at present has about several 
hundred active business associations.  
 
4. Previous empirical studies on business associations in Russia 
 
The first empirical study exploring business associations in the Russian economy was arguably an 
article by Recanatini & Ryterman (2001). Drawing on conclusions from a famous paper by Blanchard & 
Kremer (1997), the authors assumed that an important characteristic feature of transition economies was 
disorganization of economic links as a result of collapsed centralized planning and control. In the 
absence of alternative mechanisms for supplier-consumer coordination, this disorganization results in a 
dramatic slump in production. In this context, Recanatini and Ryterman view business associations as an 
institute of self-organization, supporting inter-firm coordination and reducing transformation costs. 
Their analysis, drawing on the World Bank survey data of 1992-1994, showed that in the early 1990s, 
Russian firms – members of business associations – saw a lower decline in output, especially in cases 
when respective associations included both suppliers and consumers. However, these conclusions were 
based on a very small sample of only 157 firms, of which only 58 were members of business 
associations.    
Thereafter, interaction between Russian enterprises and business associations, including 
determinants and benefits of their membership, were analyzed in a number of empirical studies, based 
on more representative samples. Of particular note may be papers by Timothy Frye, William Pyle, 
Victoria Golikova and Stanislav Markus, drawing on major formalized business surveys. 
Using an original survey of 500 firms from all the sectors of the economy (with the exception of 
agriculture and the social sector) and conducted in eight Russian regions in 2000, Frye (2002) 
demonstrated that membership in business associations offers firms more lobbying power to influence 
legislation, especially at the regional and local levels. For example, Frye’s data indicated that the 
probability that a member firm would lobby successfully at the regional level was 0.31, versus 0.11 for 
non-members (Frye, 2002, p.1027). Frye also showed in this paper that firms enjoying government 
support have to face additional costs, including price regulation, more frequent inspections by various 
regulators, and higher business barriers (Frye, 2002, p.1029). Drawing on these findings, Frye argued 
that a framework of exchange evolves between enterprises and government authorities (first of all, at the 
regional level). 
Pyle (2007 & 2009), using data of the 2003-2004 surveys, shows that member firms are much 
more frequently asked to participate in “working groups” and advisory boards with government 
agencies. Moreover, business association members participating in such working groups are observed to 
have considerable influence on the drafting of laws and regulations. Further on, Pyle explored how 
enterprises respond to unplanned inspections by government regulators and supervisors (e.g., Fire Safety 
Service, Sanitary and Epidemiological Service). The survey asked if respondents ever contested 
disagreeable unplanned inspections or their results and if they ever sought redress. The study showed 
that, ceteris paribus, association members more frequently appealed to arbitration courts and to 
government authorities to seek protection from the unfair actions of supervisory bodies. 
                                                          
7 The list overlapped but did not coincide with the lists of collective members of top business associations, as the survey was 
focused exclusively on manufacturing, while RSPP, TPP and OPORA include associations from all sectors of the economy. 
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Another paper in this series (Pyle, 2006) explores associations’ horizontal coordination functions 
and their role in facilitating inter-firm information flows and provision of services to firms. Pyle 
describes how enterprises make use of the opportunities provided by their membership in business 
associations, including training, sharing new information about relevant markets, facilitation of 
investment, and introduction of new technologies and innovative practices. It is noteworthy that 
respondents generally gave a high assessment of the value of services provided by business associations. 
Further on, the article explores the relationship between association membership and member 
performance. Regression analysis reveals that association membership is positively associated with an 
increase in sales. These results offer less than satisfactory evidence of causation. However, they suggest 
that as far back as the early 2000s, business associations were joined by more proactive enterprises 
seeking assistance in investment attraction and implementation of innovations. At the same time, these 
enterprises demonstrated stronger growth.  
The literature focusing on firm membership determinants and the role of associations in firm 
activities and performance includes a noteworthy paper (Golikova, 2009). The paper is based on a 2005 
survey of 822 joint stock companies in manufacturing and communications. Further contributing to the 
results obtained by Pyle, regression analysis of the 2005 survey data showed that an important 
determinant of association membership is the administrative status of the city or town where the 
enterprise is based. Indeed, Moscow-based enterprises show the highest membership rates, followed by 
enterprises located in regional capitals and then come enterprises based in provincial towns and urban 
communities. Golikova also showed that association membership closely correlated with assistance 
received by enterprises from regional and local authorities. Membership in several associations was 
positively related to the probability of receiving both financial and administrative assistance from the 
authorities (controlling for other variables, including firm size).  
A paper by Markus (2009) suggests a hypothesis that in the context of weak legal institutions, 
various “alliances” of enterprises with their counterparties (foreign investors, government authorities or 
other firms from the same sector or region) may emerge as informal mechanisms of property rights 
protection. Guided by this approach, Markus interprets association membership as an indicator of 
enterprise integration in the business community, ensuring better protection from state predation and 
dishonest counterparty behavior. This hypothesis was built on earlier theoretical research and an 
analysis of 67 interviews with business leaders and government officials. The paper cites examples of 
cases in which business associations actually succeeded in building frameworks of resistance to 
illegitimate behaviors by bureaucrats.  
To test his hypothesis, Markus reviewed the results of the 2007 survey of 516 enterprises (mostly 
industrial) located in Russia and Ukraine. The findings of the regression analysis suggested that 
association membership was positively related to enterprise perceptions of security vis-à-vis illegitimate 
government actions and dishonest behavior of the counterparties.  
 
5.  The data 
 
In our own study, we used data from a survey of 957 Russian enterprises conducted from 
February to June of 2009 as part of the second round of manufacturing competitiveness monitoring by 
the Higher School of Economics Institute for Industrial and Market Studies (IIMS) and the Levada 
Center commissioned by the Ministry for Economic Development. 
According to the monitoring program, the survey asked questions about the density of 
competition, investments, export and innovation activities, ownership and control, business interaction 
with the authorities, labor and other factor markets. Two questions asked about firm membership in 
business associations.  
The surveyed enterprises represent eight manufacturing industries, classified according to the 
All-Russian Classification of Economic Activities: food processing, textiles and garments, timber and 
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woodworking, chemicals, metals and fabricated metal goods, electrical, electronic and optical 
equipment, transport vehicles and equipment and machines and equipment. The enterprises were located 
in 48 Russian regions, with most surveyed firms based in regional capital cities (45 percent, excluding 
Moscow) and provincial towns and cities under republican, regional and district jurisdictions (41%).8 In 
68% of cases, questionnaires were directed at general and executive directors, 31% were directed at 
deputy general directors for economics and finance, and only in 14 cases did respondents hold other 
positions. 
The survey focused on medium-sized and large enterprises rather than on super-large and large 
ones. About 14% of the sample employed fewer than 100 workers, 55% employed between 100 and 
500, and 31% had workforces in excess of 500. Most enterprises (75%) were founded before 1992, 
while 15% were established between 1992 and 1998. 
Twenty eight percent of the sample enterprises were part of business groups, 10% had foreign 
shareholders, and 11% included the state among their owners. To describe regional variation, the survey 
used the Expert RA regional investment potential rating. Regions with low investment potential hosted 
41% of the surveyed firms, while 30% were located in high-potential regions. The surveyed enterprises 
employed about 8% of the total payroll in manufacturing, producing about 6% of manufacturing output 
in 2007. 
In addition to a formalized survey of businesses in the spring of 2010, we also undertook a series 
of in-depth, non-formalized interviews with heads of 23 business associations in four Russian regions. 
The interviews helped us to obtain a better understanding of how enterprises interact with associations.  
 
6.  Descriptive statistics 
 
To assess the rates of firm membership in business associations, the results of the 2009 survey 
were compared with Pyle’s 2003 screening survey data and the findings of two other surveys 
administered by the Higher School of Economics in 2005 and 2007. Summary membership data for 
2005, 2007 and 2009 are presented in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Rates of firm membership in business associations (BA) 
 2003 2005 2007 2009 
Sector 
Average 
size  
Share 
of BA 
membe
rs 
Average 
size  
Share 
of BA 
membe
rs 
Average 
size  
Share 
of BA 
membe
rs 
Average 
size 
Share 
of BA 
membe
rs 
Manufacturing 485 34,2% 1545 45.5% 617 36.6% 587 38.5% 
Communications - - 5780 38.0% 274 38.9% - - 
Commerce  - - - - 168 9.7% - - 
Transport - - - - 819 25.0% - - 
Construction - - - - 256 29.4% - - 
Other  - - - - 404 43.5% - - 
Sampling 
description  
1353 industrial 
enterprises in 48 
Russian regions 822 JSCs in 64 
Russian regions 
507 firms in 8 
regions of European 
Russia 
957 manufacturing 
firms in 48 Russian 
regions  
 
The coverage of sectors varied strongly, depending on the year of the survey. In 2003, Pyle’s 
sample included enterprises from seven manufacturing industries. The HSE samples of 2005 embraced 
manufacturing and communications firms, while the survey of 2007 essentially covered all of the key 
                                                          
8 Apart from that, 6% of enterprises were located in Moscow, and 8% in urban or rural communities.  
12/07/2011 
economy sectors, albeit with a narrower regional coverage. The survey of 2009 focused exclusively on 
manufacturing (eight sectors overlapping but not coinciding with Pyle’s sample).  
Further, the sample of 2005 is different by focusing exclusively on joint stock companies. The 
data in Table 1 show that the sample is largely skewed toward larger firms, which have a traditionally 
stronger membership in business associations.  
The 2007 data are of particular interest because they represent all the key sectors. These data 
suggest that the lowest participation rate was observable in commerce (under 10%). The highest rate of 
membership in business associations – about 40% – was seen in industry, communications and other 
sectors (including banks and other financial institutions and real estate agencies). 
The 2009 survey data are generally incomparable with the 2005 and 2007 data. However, 
because the 2009 study is representative of the total manufacturing sector, while the 2007 survey is 
representative of appropriate sectors for the eight regions for which it was administered, it may be 
possible to compare the results of both surveys obtained for manufacturing enterprises. A similar 
comparison is possible for the 2003 data. Data in Table 2 suggest that these results are quite close, 
showing a nascent trend for growth: in 2009, 38.5% of surveyed firms reported their engagement in 
business associations, compared with 37% of industrial respondents in 2007 and 34% in 2003. It should 
be noted that higher membership rates in 2005 (45.5%) may be related to the considerably larger 
average size of firms included in that sample. 
Therefore, overall, previous survey results suggest that since mid-2000, about 40% of 
manufacturing companies have belonged to business associations. 
Further on in the paper, drawing on descriptive statistics of the 2009 survey, we will review the 
key characteristics of firms participating in business associations.  
Association membership and perception of its value. The 2009 survey not only asked 
respondents whether they were members of business associations but also to provide the names of the 
associations to which they belonged. Using the results, a database of business associations was built, 
with an option to further add data from available sources. Drawing on this database, a classification of 
associations was constructed to be extensively used in further analysis. In contrast to the previous 
surveys, this classification may be viewed as more accurate and informative. Specifically, the HSE 
surveys of 2005 and 2007 and the baseline survey by Pyle in 2004 asked respondents to classify their 
associations into various categories, e.g., national, sector-specific and region-specific. Indeed, in the 
absence of data on association names, there was no way to verify the accuracy of such classification. 
In addition to the detailed question about the names of associations, respondents were also asked 
to comment on the value of membership. However, the questionnaires did not offer multiple-choice 
answers, as the task was to briefly describe in one’s own words the benefits of membership for the 
enterprise. Responses to this question helped to identify those enterprises that found their membership 
useful. Figure 1 shows that 19% of respondents of the 38% who responded positively to the membership 
question found their association membership useful for their business.  
However, it is noteworthy that about 4% of all the respondents (about 11% of association 
members) reported membership but found it difficult to provide at least an approximate name of the 
association to which they belonged. In our view, such responses are evidence that these enterprises not 
only receive no benefits from association membership, but also do not even participate in their activities, 
nor do they bear any related costs. Therefore, in further analysis, they were grouped together with non-
members.9 
 
                                                          
9 This approach was validated by regression analysis. All the model specifications showed that this category was 
indistinguishable from non-members.  
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Figure 1. Association membership and perception of membership usefulness. 
 
 
In addition to exploring the overall impact of association membership, this analysis also sought 
to understand how this impact depends on the characteristics of associations. In particular, with regard 
to the findings of earlier research and data from in-depth qualitative interviews, we differentiated among 
the following three categories of associations: 
- top nationwide associations (RSPP, OPORA and Delovaya Rossiya, including their regional 
affiliates), drawing their membership from across sectors and regions; 
- sector-specific associations, drawing their nationwide membership from one sector or  many 
regions; 
- region-specific associations, drawing their membership from one region and usually only one 
sector.  
A separate group included the Chamber of Commerce and Industry (TPP) and its regional 
affiliates. This separation was related to a special legal status of chambers of commerce and industry in 
Russia (they operate on the basis of a special law) and the TPP’s monopoly for servicing enterprises in 
certification of goods for exports and imports. This circumstance, in particular, explains TPP’s weak 
dependence on membership fees (as revealed by our 2010 in-depth interviews with business 
associations’ officials, membership fees do not account for more than 5-10% of regional TPP budgets). 
Our survey showed that 50% of member firms participated in sectoral associations, 37% in 
regional associations, 20% in TPP and only 14.5% were members of the top three  associations (RSPP, 
OPORA and Delovaya Rossia). Roughly one in every four enterprises was a member of two or more 
business associations. 
Figure 2 presents an estimate of BA membership value, depending on the type of association. 
The data show that about 64% of firms belonging to TPP or top associations reported their membership 
to be useful. This share is somewhat lower for sector-specific associations (61%) and significantly lower 
for regional associations (only 53%). 
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Figure 2. Value of membership across various types of associations. 
 
 
Regional variation. Another important observation relates to considerable variation of 
association membership across enterprises located in communities of different administrative status. 
Figure 3 shows that the proportion of association membership is considerably higher – 42% – for firms 
located in regional and republican capitals (excluding Moscow). Other communities show much lower 
membership rates of similar levels, 25-28%.  
 
 
 
Figure 3. Proportion of association members in settlements of various types. 
 
 
Observing the regional dimension, the Expert RA regional investment rating helped to reveal that 
involvement of enterprises in business associations tends to decline in more economically developed 
regions (Figure 4). This observation is broadly consistent with a conclusion by Doner & Schneider 
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(2000) that business associations tend to be more active if exposed to higher external pressures.10 
Further on in the paper, this observation will be verified by regression analysis. 
 
 
Figure 4. Share of association members in regions with varying investment potential. 
 
Other characteristics of firms participating in business associations. A tentative analysis on the 
basis of bi-variable distributions (see Table 2) also suggests that members show a significantly higher 
innovative and investment activity and better management. However, they demonstrate a considerably 
lower rate of rank-and-file members of business groups (while parent companies are practically equally 
distributed between members and non-members of associations).  
 
 
Table 2. Proportions of various types of enterprises in members and non-members of business associations (BA) 
  Members of BA Non-members of BA 
(some) foreign ownership  11% 7%
(some) government ownership  10% 9%
Unitary enterprises 4% 5%
No response to ownership question 10% 20%
Business group member (parent company) 4% 3%
Business group member (subsidiary) 21% 27%
      
Active in innovations* 41% 24%
ISO certification 57% 45%
Management Quality Index** 4.25 3.14
Investment Activity Index*** 1.32 0.98
*) The innovators group included firms, which implemented a new product or technology in 2008 and had nonzero R&D 
costs in 2008 (for more detail see Gonchar, 2009) 
**) The index aggregates responses to the question on managerial innovations, takes on the values from 1 through 9  
***) The index is constructed on the basis of the following values of the original variable: 0 = no investment in 2005-2008; 1 
= insignificant investments, 2 = major investments 
 
Another interesting observation is related to differences in ownership structure. With a roughly 
equal (compared with the sample average) share of government-owned companies, association members 
                                                          
10 We can assume that regions with a high investment potential also show higher demand, while the resident enterprises face 
easier budget constraints. 
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featured a considerably higher share of companies with foreign equity. On the other hand, association 
membership was lower in the group of companies that refused to respond to the survey question about 
their ownership structure. 
Business association membership and interaction with state actors. To determine how association 
membership impacts firm relations with government authorities, the questionnaire included a number of 
specially designed questions. 
First, respondents were asked if their enterprise provided any assistance to regional and/or local 
authorities in regional social development in 2007-2008 (e.g., maintenance of social facilities and 
housing or sponsor support to regional/municipal programs).  
If the response was affirmative, respondents were asked to provide a rough estimate of the 
average annual amount of their assistance as a ratio of their sales proceeds. Figure 5 presents a 
distribution of responses. Only 23% of firms did not provide any assistance to the authorities, while the 
overwhelming majority of the other enterprises (56.5%) estimated their assistance as marginal: 
respondents were either undecided about its size or indicated that it was under 0.1% of their sales. For 
the purpose of regression analysis, we aligned the responses to this question and constructed an ordinal 
variable taking five values (from 0 through 4). 
 
 
Figure 5. Assistance by firms to regional and local authorities. 
 
Second, respondents were asked to indicate separately if their enterprise received any financial 
and/or administrative assistance from federal, regional and local authorities in 2007-2008.11 Figure 6 
shows rates of positive responses. 
 
 
                                                          
11 Administrative support means any non-financial support, including assistance in interaction with other state actors and 
business partners, becoming connected to infrastructure networks and plots of land. 
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Figure 6. Receipt of financial and administrative support from various levels of government. 
 
Apparently, local and regional authorities significantly and more frequently provided 
administrative support to businesses, while federal authorities were largely focused on financial 
instruments of support. Of greater note, regional authorities were generally more active in supporting 
enterprises.  
Further on, we used three binary variables to reflect the support (financial and/or administrative) 
received from federal, regional and local authorities, respectively. 
Table 3 presents summary data on assistance to the authorities and receipt of government support 
by member and non-member enterprises 
 
Table 3. Membership in BA and relations with various levels of government 
  
Members 
of BA 
Non-members 
of BA 
No assistance 17% 26%
Under 0.1% of sales or no response on the size 57% 57%
Provision of 
assistance to regional 
and local government 
authorities Above 0.1% of sales 27% 17%
Federal level 16% 12%
Regional level  34% 21%
Receipt of assistance 
from government 
authorities of various 
levels Local level  25% 17%
 
Paired comparisons of averages suggest that association members are broadly more active in 
providing assistance to regional and local authorities and also tend to receive regional and local 
government support more frequently. Federal support also shows some bias toward association 
members, but it is less noticeable. 
 
7. Main hypotheses and research strategy  
 
Drawing on summary results of previous research and our preliminary consideration of the 2009 
survey data, we have formulated the following hypotheses to analyze factors influencing decisions to 
join associations: 
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1. We assume that business associations are more frequently joined by:  
 
a) Larger enterprises. This effect relates to the fact that big players find it easier to agree on 
collective action (Olson, 1965). Moreover, given the sheer scale of their businesses, they 
can be more strongly affected by changes in the rules of the game, while bearing roughly 
similar lobbying costs. This effect has been noted in many studies, including those based 
on Russia’s data (Pyle, 2006; Golikova, 2009), but nevertheless, we wanted to test it 
against our data. Big players should also have a stronger position in the business 
association. A smaller firm normally would be a rank-and-file member with few chances 
to advance its interests, while a larger company may be a more efficient lobbyist. In other 
words, larger companies are better positioned to influence the rules of the game. 
 
b) Firms located in regional capital cities. In smaller towns, authorities are more accessible. 
Therefore, medium-sized and large companies do not need special organizations to 
interact with government officials, while coordination of business activities of enterprises 
may be achieved via informal meetings of their managers. In contrast, in Moscow, the 
high number of enterprises is an impediment to collective action, while officials are 
accessible only to the largest enterprises or to the most high-profile associations. Against 
this backdrop, regional capitals have a manageable but not too small number of 
enterprises. Access to the governor for an individual enterprise (especially if it is 
medium-sized) may be restricted, but collective appeals on behalf of a sector may have 
effect. On balance, regional capital cities seem to offer an optimal combination of 
business concentration and access to government. Saving time and transport costs may 
also play a role: to maintain contacts with the authorities, business association offices 
should be located in administrative centers (Moscow and regional capital cities). 
However, in this case, the firms based in the same administrative centers would have 
lower costs of contacting with associations. 
 
c) Firms active in exports, investment and innovation. Such “modernizing” activities of 
firms result in more external restrictions for them in the business environment.12 This fact 
has been recorded in many studies (see Golikova et al. (2007), Yakovlev and Frye 
(2007)), and it may be interpreted as a stronger pressure on active enterprises, in the 
language of Doner & Schneider (2000). Accordingly, such enterprises may be more 
motivated towards collective action, seeking to change the “rules of the game.” 
 
d) Firms with foreign equity. Foreign investors, who traditionally prefer official and legal 
channels to address their business problems, may find business associations attractive as 
an instrument of civilized public interaction with the authorities  
 
 
2. We assume that business associations are less frequently joined by:  
 
a) Subsidiaries in business groups. Their lower participation rates in business associations 
may be accounted for by the fact that their interests are taken care of by their parent 
                                                          
12 In particular, investing, exporting and innovative firms inevitably would have more counterparties or would have more 
complicated relations with them. Therefore, such firms would run higher risks of contractual non-performance and other 
violations of property rights and, consequently, would have higher requirements to the quality of business environment.  
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companies, which lobby for them at various levels. Additionally, the function of 
horizontal cooperation development (which is a frequent role of business associations 
internationally – see Doner & Schneider (2000), Locke (2001)) may be less relevant for 
enterprises belonging to business groups. Their technological development and more 
efficient inclusion in value chains will normally occur within their business groups, 
supervised by the parent company. 
 
b) Firms that do not respond regarding their ownership structure. Membership in business 
associations suggests the firm’s willingness to cooperate with other companies, to act in a 
public space and to disclose information about itself. Therefore, we may anticipate that 
non-transparent companies (identified by no response to the ownership question) would 
be less inclined to participate in business associations. 
 
Regarding business association membership implications for business-government interface, the 
following hypotheses were formulated:  
 
3. Business associations are mediators between government and business and serve as a 
mechanism to facilitate exchanges between business and the state, as explored by T.Frye 
(Frye, 2002) and supported by further research (Yakovlev, 2007; Yakovlev, 2010). 
Therefore, we may assume that  
  
a) Association members provide more frequent assistance to regional and local authorities in 
regional social development; 
 
b) Association members more frequently receive government support. 
 
 
4. Associations of different types will provide different kinds of access to government support 
for their members. These variations may be related to membership coverage and 
associations’ focus on different activities. In this context we may hypothesize that: 
a) Government support would more frequently go to enterprises belonging to top and sector-
specific business associations. Because these associations are more broad-based, they 
may have a better negotiating capacity in their interaction with government, and 
therefore, they may be more successful in securing government support for their 
members.  
 
b) Members of TPP do not enjoy any preferences in receiving access to government support 
because, judging by in-depth qualitative interviews, the TPP network is more focused on 
provision of business services rather than on lobbying the interests of its members.  
 
 
The hypotheses regarding factors influencing association membership were tested in a series of 
probit-type regressions. Business association membership was a binary dependent variable (0 – non-
member, 1 – member). Explanatory variables included firm size, administrative status of their home 
city/town, ownership structure (state participation, foreign equity, no response), and membership in 
business groups. Further specifications of the model additionally included export activities, major 
investments, and technological and managerial innovations. Results were controlled for the sector, 
economic development of the region (groupings by investment potential ratings) and the time of firm 
establishment. 
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To explore interaction with government, during the first stage, we used ordinal probit 
regressions, where assistance to regional and local authorities in the social development of the region 
was included as a dependent variable (0 – no assistance; 4 – assistance of above 0.3% of sales). Four 
dummies capturing membership in a sector-specific, regional, peak associations and TPP were used as 
explanatory variables. In addition to controlling for the sector, economic development of the region and 
time of establishment, we also used controls for all the variables earlier included in the membership 
determinants regression. This exercise resulted in identifying the “net effect” of association membership 
influencing assistance to government, unrelated to the factors influencing firms’ decisions to join 
business associations.  
A similar approach was used during the second stage while assessing factors influencing 
provision of government support. Respective probit regressions used dummies for receipt of government 
support from federal, regional and local authorities as dependant variables, and dummies for firm 
participation in sector-specific, regional, top “peak” associations and the TPP as explanatory variables. 
For controls, we used all the variables included in the models during the first stage, including the 
provision of assistance to authorities.  
 
8.  Regression analysis results 
 
Firm-specific characteristics’ influence on business association membership. To determine 
to what extent business association membership is influenced by firm-specific characteristics, we used 
probit-type assessments. Key results are provided in Table 4. 
Regression analysis has confirmed the findings of previous research about a positive relationship 
between enterprise size and the probability of its membership in a business association. Replacement of 
the log employees with firm categories by size revealed a threshold, i.e., firms employing over 500 
workers tended to participate in associations much more frequently, while differences among other-sized 
groups proved insignificant.  
Location in a regional capital increased the probability of association membership by 13 
percentage points vis-à-vis firms from provincial capitals (p<0.01) in all the model specifications.  
In the group of modernization activity determinants, high significance for association 
participation was shown by managerial and technological innovation and investment (р<0.01 for all 
these factors), with a lower significance demonstrated by ISO certification (р<0.10) and zero 
significance of exporting operations. 
The assumption of a positive relationship between foreign equity and association membership 
was not confirmed, with the respective coefficients positive but not significant 
The hypothesis of a negative relationship between business group membership (as rank-and-file 
members) and association membership was confirmed at the 5% level of statistic significance.  
Finally, no-response to ownership questions proved to be negatively related to business 
association participation. This correlation was highly significant (p<0.01) in all the model specifications. 
This group of enterprises showed a 15% percentage point lower number of association members, with 
the sample average of 34% (excluding firms that failed to give names of associations where they 
belonged). 
Assistance to regional and local authorities. Correlation between association membership and 
assistance to regional and local authorities was explored by ordered probit regressions. The intensity of 
assistance was described by the ordinal variable described above. Two approaches were utilized to 
describe association membership. One approach used a binary variable capturing membership in any 
type of association. The other approach employed a series of binary variables capturing membership in 
associations of different types (according to the classification above). Thus, effects of membership in 
these associations can be compared. The computed outputs are shown in Tables 5a and 5b. 
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A calculation using the aggregated membership variable reveals that, on average, association 
members tend to more actively assist regional and local authorities. However, a further analysis 
indicated that the intensity of assistance varies depending on the association type. A stronger and more 
statistically significant effect is found exclusively in the case of membership in sector-specific 
associations. Membership in regional business associations and TPP shows a statistically insignificant 
and weak positive effect. Importantly, the coefficient for the variable capturing membership in 
nationwide associations (RSPP, OPORA and Delovaya Rossia) has a rather high value while remaining 
statistically insignificant. This may be related to a relatively low number of such enterprises in the 
sample 
Enterprise size is positively related to business-government cooperation, with a higher share of 
revenues spent by larger enterprises on assistance to government authorities. Noticeably more frequent 
is assistance to authorities from innovative enterprises, enterprises active in investment, ISO-certified 
enterprises and enterprises enhancing management. The fact that the association membership effect is 
robust to inclusion of control variables implies that association membership as such is positively related 
to more active assistance to government. 
 
Association membership and support from government. Three dummies for receipt of 
support from federal, regional and local authorities were used as dependent variables. Association 
membership was captured in an aggregate variable in one case (member/non-member of any type of 
association), and in the other case, it is captured in a number of variables describing types of 
associations. Because government support may be a result of the enterprise’s assistance to the 
authorities, a respective variable was included in regressions as a control. Tables 6 – 8 present results of 
analyzing the possible influence of various factors on the probability of receiving support from federal, 
regional and local authorities. 
As evidenced by the data, business associations proved insignificant for receiving federal 
support. Moreover, this result was consistent across all types of associations. However, it may be 
noteworthy that the assistance provided by the enterprise to regional and local authorities had a very 
weak effect on getting support from federal authorities. Support was received by enterprises of higher 
national importance, i.e., large or parent companies. More frequently, federal support went to 
government-owned enterprises and firms based in underdeveloped regions. 
Regarding support from regional and local authorities, association membership was positively 
correlated with getting support. An analysis by types of associations resulted in the following findings:  
Regional authorities tend to much more frequently (by 19 percentage points on average) support 
national-level association members. Membership in sector-specific associations increased the 
probability of receiving support by 13 percentage points. The coefficient capturing the effect from 
regional association membership was bordering statistical insignificance (slightly above seven 
percentage points). The effect from participation in TPP was negative (though statistically insignificant).  
Other significant factors influencing probability of support from regional authorities included 
assistance to regional authorities in the social development of the region. Overall, regional authorities 
tended to be more supportive of larger and more proactive enterprises (which made major investments in 
2007-2008, implemented innovations and demonstrated a higher level of management). 
The local level exhibited similar trends. Most frequently, support went to members of national-
level associations (+15 percentage points versus non-members), and somewhat less frequently, it was 
provided to members of sector-specific and regional associations (+7-9 percentage points). TPP 
members tended to receive support less frequently, as in the case of regional authorities, but the variance 
remained insignificant.  
Apart from association members, support was noticeably more frequently enjoyed by unitary 
enterprises and companies with foreign equity. Neither the size nor modernization activities of 
enterprises had any significant impact on local government decisions to provide support.  
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An interesting finding was received regarding the group of enterprises that did not respond to the 
question on the ownership structure. As noted above, those enterprises less frequently joined business 
associations. They also less frequently provided assistance to the authorities in the social development 
of the region but significantly more frequently received regional and local government support. In sum, 
it may suggest that this group is dominated by enterprises affiliated with local and regional officials. 
 
9. Discussion and conclusions  
 
       The quantitative analysis suggests the following. The proportion of manufacturing companies 
belonging to business associations is close to 40%, exhibiting a marginal trend for growth if compared 
with earlier survey evidence. Over half of the member companies perceive their membership in business 
associations useful.  
       Regression analysis of the data of the 2009 survey show that larger enterprises and firms in 
regional capitals more often join business associations. We can suppose that precisely this type of city 
offers the opportunity to achieve an optimal combination of concentrated business activity with possible 
access to authorities. Membership in associations also proved to be related to activity of the firms in 
investment and innovation. The reason may be that the enterprises that are expanding the scope of their 
activities are more often facing problems in the business environment, such that they have more 
incentives to join efforts to change it, using business associations as one of instruments to do so. 
In our regression analysis, we also have singled out the factors that lower the likelihood of 
membership in business associations. One of these factors is belonging to an integrated business group 
(holding group). We believe that enterprises of this type can more easily solve their problems in their 
parent companies, which usually belong to nationwide business associations. At the same time, business 
groups may we unwilling to see that their subsidiaries independently cooperate with firms of similar 
profiles in industry-wide and regional associations.  
Another “negative” factor is the refusal of our respondents to answer the question about 
ownership structure. In our opinion, membership in enterprise organizations presumes that a firm is 
ready to disclose certain information about itself. Thus, the firms that are unwilling to disclose 
information about themselves would be less inclined to join the associations. 
Our regression analysis has also confirmed that business associations are a component of what 
Frye (2002) calls an “elite exchange”– although only on regional and local levels. These “exchanges” 
imply that members of business associations, on the one hand, more actively assist regional and local 
authorities in social development of their regions, and on the other hand, they more often receive 
support from authorities. However, this effect is insignificant in terms of support from the federal 
government.  
The most active participants in this “system of exchanges” are member enterprises from 
industry- and nationwide “leading” associations (RSPP, OPORA and Delovaya Rossia). This may be 
due to their strong bargaining power in their relations with regional and local authorities. However, the 
“exchange effects” that we have discovered are not related to members of chambers of trade and 
industry. This may be due to the fact that the system of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry is 
mostly focused on providing business services rather than on lobbying interests of its members.  
In general, our results allow us to believe that at present, business associations (especially the 
industry-wide and “leading” ones) consolidate the most active, advanced companies and act as 
collective representatives of their interests. For this reason, business associations can be regarded as 
interface units between the authorities and businesses and as a possible instrument for promotion of 
economic development. 
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Table 4. Determinants of firm membership in business associations 
  BA membership (dummy) 
Log employees 0.076***13 0.058*** 0.059*** 0.063*** 0.068*** 0.076*** 
  [0.015]14 [0.016] [0.016] [0.016] [0.016] [0.016] 
  
0.015 -0.023 -0.005 0.009 0.012 0.015 Type of settlement: Moscow  
15 [0.078] [0.075] [0.077] [0.079] [0.078] [0.078] 
0.134*** 0.126*** 0.133*** 0.124*** 0.134*** 0.134*** Type of settlement: regional 
capital [0.034] [0.035] [0.035] [0.035] [0.035] [0.034] 
0.039 0.056 0.033 0.053 0.042 0.039 Type of settlement: urban 
village [0.069] [0.069] [0.069] [0.069] [0.069] [0.069] 
0.034 0.039 0.038 0.030 0.027 0.034 Investment potential of the 
region (low)16 [0.039] [0.039] [0.040] [0.039] [0.039] [0.039] 
-0.027 -0.013 -0.025 -0.037 -0.032 -0.027 Investment potential of the 
region (high) [0.044] [0.044] [0.045] [0.044] [0.044] [0.044] 
  
-0.0004 0.010 0.032 0.013 0.004 -0.0004 (some) government ownership  
[0.0746] [0.077] [0.079] [0.076] [0.076] [0.0746] 
0.067 0.057 0.053 0.060 0.066 0.067 (some) foreign ownership  
[0.059] [0.059] [0.060] [0.059] [0.059] [0.060] 
-0.046 -0.021 0.006 -0.024 -0.039 -0.046 Unitary enterprise 
[0.074] [0.076] [0.080] [0.078] [0.074] [0.075] 
-0.155*** -0.153*** -0.123*** -0.151*** -0.157*** -0.155*** No response to ownership 
question [0.038] [0.038] [0.042] [0.039] [0.038] [0.038] 
-0.015 -0.027 -0.005 -0.025 -0.016 -0.015 Holding group (parent 
company) [0.084] [0.082] [0.088] [0.084] [0.084] [0.084] 
-0.077** -0.090** -0.081** -0.072** -0.079** -0.077** 
Holding group (subsidiary) [0.037] [0.036] [0.037] [0.037] [0.037] [0.037] 
  
0.016 0.003 0.009 0.014 0.015 0.016 Time of foundation: 1992-
199817 [0.047] [0.047] [0.048] [0.047] [0.047] [0.047] 
-0.077 -0.075 -0.072 -0.070 -0.076 -0.077 Time of foundation: since 
1999 [0.054] [0.054] [0.056] [0.055] [0.054] [0.054] 
  
  0.119***         Management quality 
(medium)18   [0.037]         
  0.176***         Management quality (high) 
  [0.049]         
    0.090***       Active in innovations 
    [0.021]       
      0.115***     Investment Activity Index 
      [0.040]     
ISO certification         0.062*   
          [0.035]   
Exporter dummy           -0.0004 
            [0.0382] 
Sector Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sample size 952 952 928 952 952 952 
                                                          
13Significance levels: *** - 1%, ** - 5%, * - 10%. 
14 Standard errors in brackets. 
15 Type of settlement: provincial towns is omitted. 
16 Investment potential of the region: medium  is omitted. 
17 Time of foundation: before 1992 is omitted 
18 Management quality (medium) is omitted. 
12/07/2011 
 
Table 5a. Determinants of firms’ assistance to regional and local authorities  
 Assistance to regional and local authorities 
BA membership  0.243*** 0.216*** 0.204*** 0.218*** 0.236*** 0.243*** 
  [0.076] [0.077] [0.077] [0.077] [0.076] [0.076] 
Log employees 0.142*** 0.112*** 0.132*** 0.110*** 0.123*** 0.120*** 
  [0.035] [0.036] [0.037] [0.036] [0.036] [0.036] 
  
0.236 0.173 0.223 0.224 0.229 0.220 
Type of settlement: Moscow [0.177] [0.180] [0.179] [0.177] [0.176] [0.178] 
-0.174** -0.187** -0.167** -0.198*** -0.175** -0.178** Type of settlement: regional 
capital [0.076] [0.077] [0.077] [0.077] [0.077] [0.077] 
-0.041 -0.015 -0.054 -0.008 -0.038 -0.049 Type of settlement: urban 
village [0.131] [0.132] [0.131] [0.131] [0.130] [0.131] 
-0.052 -0.044 -0.063 -0.063 -0.069 -0.062 Investment potential of the 
region (low) [0.082] [0.083] [0.084] [0.083] [0.083] [0.083] 
-0.469*** -0.447*** -0.480*** -0.498*** -0.481*** -0.475*** Investment potential of the 
region (high) [0.103] [0.103] [0.104] [0.103] [0.103] [0.102] 
  
-0.167 -0.158 -0.179 -0.135 -0.16 -0.175 (some) government ownership  
[0.155] [0.155] [0.157] [0.155] [0.156] [0.154] 
0.158 0.148 0.131 0.146 0.161 0.128 (some) foreign ownership 
[0.126] [0.126] [0.128] [0.127] [0.127] [0.128] 
-0.368* -0.322* -0.304 -0.312* -0.352* -0.333* Unitary enterprises 
[0.190] [0.190] [0.191] [0.188] [0.190] [0.191] 
-0.227** -0.224** -0.195* -0.213** -0.227** -0.222** No response to ownership 
question [0.100] [0.100] [0.105] [0.100] [0.100] [0.100] 
-0.051 -0.077 -0.029 -0.080 -0.055 -0.063 Holding group (parent 
company) [0.211] [0.210] [0.209] [0.204] [0.211] [0.210] 
Holding group (subsidiary) -0.092 -0.119 -0.105 -0.082 -0.097 -0.086 
 [0.082] [0.083] [0.085] [0.082] [0.082] [0.082] 
  
-0.064 -0.077 -0.081 -0.071 -0.065 -0.066 Time of foundation: 1992-
1998 [0.107] [0.108] [0.109] [0.107] [0.107] [0.107] 
-0.020 -0.022 0.005 0.0006 -0.019 -0.033 Time of foundation: since 
1999 [0.120] [0.121] [0.120] [0.121] [0.120] [0.120] 
  
  0.143*         Management quality (medium) 
  [0.083]         
  0.308***         Management quality (high) 
  [0.100]         
Active in innovations     0.119***       
     [0.045]       
      0.299***     Investment Activity Index 
      [0.086]     
        0.142*   ISO certification 
          [0.077]   
Exporter dummy           0.137 
            [0.084] 
Sector Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sample size 952 952 928 952 952 952 
 
12/07/2011 
Table 5b. Determinants of firms’ assistance to regional and local authorities 
 Assistance to regional and local authorities 
Sector-specific BA 0.248*** 0.233** 0.205** 0.212** 0.246*** 0.241** 
  [0.095] [0.096] [0.096] [0.096] [0.094] [0.095] 
Regional BA 0.135 0.115 0.133 0.118 0.125 0.147 
  [0.106] [0.108] [0.107] [0.108] [0.107] [0.106] 
0.233 0.191 0.207 0.182 0.225 0.239 RSPP, OPORA, Delovaya 
Rossia [0.166] [0.163] [0.168] [0.167] [0.167] [0.165] 
TPP 0.104 0.070 0.078 0.110 0.106 0.103 
  [0.133] [0.136] [0.134] [0.133] [0.133] [0.132] 
Log employees 0.140*** 0.111*** 0.129*** 0.110*** 0.121*** 0.119*** 
 [0.035] [0.036] [0.037] [0.036] [0.036] [0.036] 
  
Type of settlement: Moscow 0.217 0.155 0.208 0.209 0.210 0.203 
 [0.178] [0.180] [0.179] [0.177] [0.176] [0.178] 
-0.183** -0.194** -0.175** -0.204*** -0.184** -0.187** Type of settlement: regional 
capital [0.077] [0.077] [0.078] [0.077] [0.077] [0.077] 
-0.054 -0.026 -0.065 -0.021 -0.051 -0.062 Type of settlement: urban 
village [0.132] [0.133] [0.132] [0.132] [0.131] [0.132] 
-0.056 -0.049 -0.067 -0.066 -0.074 -0.066 Investment potential of the 
region (low) [0.083] [0.083] [0.084] [0.084] [0.084] [0.083] 
-0.463*** -0.443*** -0.473*** -0.493*** -0.475*** -0.468*** Investment potential of the 
region (high) [0.103] [0.103] [0.105] [0.103] [0.103] [0.103] 
  
-0.174 -0.163 -0.185 -0.142 -0.166 -0.183 (some) government ownership  
[0.156] [0.156] [0.159] [0.155] [0.157] [0.155] 
0.162 0.153 0.133 0.151 0.166 0.132 (some) foreign ownership 
[0.126] [0.126] [0.128] [0.127] [0.127] [0.128] 
-0.385** -0.338* -0.317* -0.330* -0.369* -0.350* Unitary enterprises 
[0.190] [0.191] [0.192] [0.189] [0.190] [0.192] 
-0.226** -0.224** -0.192* -0.215** -0.226** -0.221** No response to ownership 
question [0.101] [0.100] [0.105] [0.100] [0.100] [0.101] 
-0.042 -0.069 -0.021 -0.070 -0.046 -0.053 Holding group (parent 
company) [0.212] [0.210] [0.209] [0.205] [0.211] [0.210] 
Holding group (subsidiary) -0.093 -0.122 -0.106 -0.084 -0.099 -0.087 
 [0.083] [0.084] [0.085] [0.082] [0.083] [0.082] 
  
-0.055 -0.069 -0.074 -0.063 -0.057 -0.057 Time of foundation: 1992-
1998 [0.107] [0.108] [0.109] [0.107] [0.107] [0.107] 
-0.015 -0.018 0.010 0.003 -0.014 -0.028 Time of foundation: since 
1999 [0.120] [0.120] [0.119] [0.120] [0.119] [0.120] 
  
  0.140*         Management quality (medium) 
  [0.084]         
  0.305***         Management quality (high) 
  [0.101]         
    0.121***       Active in innovations 
     [0.045]       
      0.289***     Investment Activity Index 
      [0.086]     
        0.146*   ISO certification 
          [0.077]   
Exporter dummy           0.136 
            [0.085] 
Sector Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sample size 952 952 928 952 952 952 
12/07/2011 
Table 6a. Determinants of receipt of support from federal authorities 
 Support from federal authorities (dummy) 
BA membership 0.011 0.008 0.006 0.006 0.011 0.011 
  [0.020] [0.020] [0.020] [0.020] [0.020] [0.020] 
0.038* 0.035* 0.034 0.030 0.038* 0.039* Assistance to regional and 
local authorities (dummy) [0.020] [0.021] [0.021] [0.021] [0.020] [0.020] 
Log employees 0.028*** 0.024** 0.021** 0.022** 0.028*** 0.030*** 
  [0.009] [0.010] [0.010] [0.009] [0.010] [0.010] 
  
Type of settlement: Moscow 0.022 0.014 0.019 0.019 0.022 0.024 
 [0.052] [0.050] [0.052] [0.051] [0.052] [0.053] 
-0.011 -0.015 -0.007 -0.015 -0.011 -0.011 Type of settlement: regional 
capital [0.020] [0.020] [0.020] [0.020] [0.020] [0.020] 
-0.052* -0.049* -0.054** -0.046* -0.052* -0.052* Type of settlement: urban 
village [0.027] [0.028] [0.027] [0.028] [0.027] [0.027] 
0.023 0.024 0.023 0.020 0.023 0.024 Investment potential of the 
region (low) [0.022] [0.022] [0.022] [0.021] [0.022] [0.022] 
-0.072*** -0.070*** -0.071*** -0.076*** -0.072*** -0.071*** Investment potential of the 
region (high) [0.022] [0.022] [0.023] [0.021] [0.022] [0.022] 
  
0.110* 0.114* 0.124** 0.119** 0.109* 0.111* (some) government ownership  
[0.057] [0.059] [0.061] [0.059] [0.057] [0.057] 
0.027 0.027 0.026 0.023 0.027 0.030 (some) foreign ownership 
[0.040] [0.040] [0.040] [0.039] [0.040] [0.041] 
0.163** 0.175** 0.161** 0.185** 0.163** 0.154** Unitary enterprises 
[0.076] [0.079] [0.079] [0.079] [0.076] [0.075] 
-0.014 -0.0121 -0.008 -0.012 -0.014 -0.015 No response to ownership 
question [0.024] [0.024] [0.027] [0.024] [0.024] [0.024] 
0.203** 0.192** 0.216** 0.191** 0.203** 0.205** Holding group (parent 
company) [0.082] [0.080] [0.084] [0.083] [0.082] [0.082] 
Holding group (subsidiary) 0.020 0.017 0.017 0.021 0.020 0.019 
 [0.023] [0.023] [0.024] [0.023] [0.023] [0.023] 
  
-0.073*** -0.074*** -0.076*** -0.074*** -0.073*** -0.073*** Time of foundation: 1992-
1998 [0.019] [0.019] [0.019] [0.018] [0.019] [0.019] 
-0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.001 -0.003 -0.002 Time of foundation: since 
1999 [0.032] [0.032] [0.032] [0.032] [0.032] [0.032] 
  
  0.033         Management quality (medium) 
  [0.023]         
  0.036         Management quality (high) 
  [0.033]         
    0.020*       Active in innovations 
     [0.012]       
      0.058**     Investment Activity Index 
      [0.025]     
        -0.001   ISO certification 
          [0.020]   
Exporter dummy           -0.015 
            [0.022] 
Sector Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sample size 951 951 927 951 951 951 
 
12/07/2011 
Table 6b. Determinants of receipt of support from federal authorities 
 
 Support from federal authorities (dummy) 
Sector-specific BA 0.039 0.037 0.035 0.031 0.039 0.040 
  [0.028] [0.027] [0.027] [0.026] [0.028] [0.028] 
Regional BA -0.026 -0.026 -0.027 -0.027 -0.026 -0.027 
  [0.022] [0.022] [0.022] [0.022] [0.022] [0.022] 
0.033 0.027 0.029 0.022 0.033 0.033 RSPP, OPORA, Delovaya 
Rossia [0.047] [0.045] [0.046] [0.044] [0.047] [0.047] 
TPP -0.031 -0.034 -0.033 -0.029 -0.031 -0.031 
  [0.029] [0.028] [0.029] [0.029] [0.029] [0.029] 
0.037* 0.034* 0.034 0.030 0.037* 0.038* Assistance to regional and 
local authorities (dummy) [0.020] [0.021] [0.021] [0.021] [0.020] [0.020] 
Log employees 0.027*** 0.024** 0.021** 0.022** 0.028*** 0.030*** 
  [0.009] [0.010] [0.010] [0.009] [0.010] [0.010] 
  
Type of settlement: Moscow 0.010 0.002 0.007 0.009 0.010 0.012 
 [0.048] [0.046] [0.048] [0.047] [0.048] [0.049] 
-0.011 -0.014 -0.007 -0.014 -0.011 -0.010 Type of settlement: regional 
capital [0.020] [0.020] [0.020] [0.020] [0.020] [0.020] 
-0.052** -0.048* -0.054** -0.048* -0.052** -0.052* Type of settlement: urban 
village [0.026] [0.027] [0.026] [0.027] [0.026] [0.027] 
0.022 0.023 0.022 0.020 0.022 0.023 Investment potential of the 
region (low) [0.022] [0.022] [0.022] [0.021] [0.022] [0.022] 
-0.070*** -0.069*** -0.070*** -0.075*** -0.070*** -0.069*** Investment potential of the 
region (high) [0.022] [0.022] [0.022] [0.021] [0.022] [0.022] 
  
0.115** 0.120** 0.130** 0.123** 0.115** 0.117** (some) government ownership  
[0.058] [0.059] [0.061] [0.059] [0.058] [0.058] 
0.031 0.031 0.030 0.027 0.031 0.035 (some) foreign ownership  
[0.040] [0.040] [0.040] [0.039] [0.040] [0.041] 
0.159** 0.173** 0.158** 0.181** 0.159** 0.149** Unitary enterprises 
[0.077] [0.079] [0.079] [0.079] [0.076] [0.075] 
-0.015 -0.013 -0.009 -0.013 -0.015 -0.016 No response to ownership 
question [0.024] [0.024] [0.026] [0.024] [0.024] [0.024] 
0.202** 0.191** 0.215** 0.190** 0.202** 0.205** Holding group (parent 
company) [0.084] [0.082] [0.086] [0.084] [0.084] [0.084] 
Holding group (subsidiary) 0.017 0.014 0.014 0.018 0.017 0.016 
 [0.023] [0.023] [0.023] [0.023] [0.023] [0.023] 
  
-0.071*** -0.072*** -0.075*** -0.073*** -0.074*** -0.071*** Time of foundation: 1992-
1998 [0.019] [0.019] [0.019] [0.0184] [0.019] [0.019] 
-0.003 -0.003 -0.001 -0.001 -0.003 -0.002 Time of foundation: since 
1999 [0.031] [0.031] [0.032] [0.031] [0.031] [0.032] 
  
  0.031         Management quality (medium) 
  [0.023]         
  0.038         Management quality (high) 
  [0.033]         
    0.019*       Active in innovations 
     [0.012]       
      0.053**     Investment Activity Index 
      [0.025]     
        -0.001   ISO certification 
          [0.019]   
Exporter dummy           -0.017 
            [0.021] 
12/07/2011 
Sector Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sample size 951 951 927 951 951 951 
12/07/2011 
Table 7a. Determinants of receipt of support from regional authorities 
 
 Support from regional authorities (dummy) 
BA membership  0.104*** 0.091*** 0.089*** 0.092*** 0.104*** 0.104*** 
  [0.032] [0.032] [0.032] [0.032] [0.032] [0.032] 
0.119*** 0.108*** 0.111*** 0.106*** 0.119*** 0.115*** Assistance to regional and local 
authorities (dummy) [0.032] [0.032] [0.033] [0.032] [0.032] [0.032] 
Log employees 0.051*** 0.038** 0.042*** 0.039*** 0.052*** 0.044*** 
  [0.015] [0.015] [0.016] [0.015] [0.015] [0.015] 
  
Type of settlement: Moscow 0.171** 0.140 0.157* 0.170* 0.171** 0.165* 
 [0.087] [0.085] [0.086] [0.088] [0.087] [0.087] 
-0.024 -0.033 -0.024 -0.034 -0.024 -0.025 Type of settlement: regional 
capital [0.031] [0.031] [0.032] [0.031] [0.031] [0.031] 
0.079 0.092 0.075 0.096 0.079 0.075 Type of settlement: urban 
village [0.062] [0.063] [0.063] [0.064] [0.062] [0.062] 
0.032 0.035 0.029 0.027 0.032 0.028 Investment potential of the 
region (low) [0.033] [0.033] [0.034] [0.033] [0.033] [0.033] 
-0.185*** -0.181*** -0.186*** -0.197*** -0.185*** -0.188*** Investment potential of the 
region (high) [0.034] [0.034] [0.035] [0.034] [0.034] [0.034] 
  
0.106 0.114 0.132 0.122 0.106 0.103 (some) government ownership  
[0.076] [0.077] [0.082] [0.080] [0.076] [0.076] 
0.058 0.056 0.050 0.053 0.058 0.048 (some) foreign ownership  
[0.059] [0.059] [0.059] [0.060] [0.059] [0.059] 
0.131 0.156* 0.142 0.159* 0.130 0.145* Unitary enterprises 
[0.083] [0.085] [0.088] [0.085] [0.083] [0.085] 
0.086** 0.087** 0.113** 0.090** 0.086** 0.088** No response to ownership 
question [0.043] [0.043] [0.046] [0.043] [0.043] [0.043] 
0.155* 0.139 0.161* 0.137 0.155* 0.151* Holding group (parent 
company) [0.088] [0.086] [0.090] [0.089] [0.088] [0.087] 
Holding group (subsidiary) -0.0001 -0.010 -0.001 0.003 0.0000 0.002 
 [0.034] [0.034] [0.034] [0.034] [0.034] [0.034] 
  
-0.033 -0.039 -0.037 -0.038 -0.033 -0.035 Time of foundation: 1992-1998 
[0.041] [0.041] [0.041] [0.041] [0.041] [0.041] 
-0.091** -0.092** -0.090** -0.084* -0.091** -0.094** Time of foundation: since 1999 
[0.042] [0.041] [0.043] [0.043] [0.042] [0.041] 
  
  0.088***         Management quality (medium) 
  [0.034]         
  0.138***         Management quality (high) 
  [0.049]         
    0.055***       Active in innovations 
     [0.018]       
      0.127***     Investment Activity Index 
      [0.037]     
        -0.005   ISO certification 
          [0.031]   
Exporter dummy           0.048 
            [0.032] 
Sector Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sample size 951 951 927 951 951 951 
12/07/2011 
Table 7b. Determinants of receipt of support from regional authorities 
 
 Support from regional authorities (dummy) 
Sector-specific BA 0.134*** 0.126*** 0.123*** 0.120*** 0.135*** 0.132*** 
  [0.043] [0.042] [0.043] [0.043] [0.043] [0.043] 
Regional BA 0.078* 0.071 0.073 0.070 0.078* 0.083* 
  [0.046] [0.046] [0.045] [0.046] [0.046] [0.046] 
0.202*** 0.180** 0.192** 0.177** 0.202*** 0.206*** RSPP, OPORA, Delovaya 
Rossia [0.077] [0.078] [0.076] [0.077] [0.078] [0.077] 
TPP -0.059 -0.073 -0.067 -0.056 -0.059 -0.059 
  [0.051] [0.049] [0.050] [0.052] [0.051] [0.051] 
0.118*** 0.108*** 0.111*** 0.107*** 0.118*** 0.115*** Assistance to regional and local 
authorities (dummy) [0.032] [0.032] [0.033] [0.032] [0.032] [0.032] 
Log employees 0.049*** 0.036** 0.040*** 0.038*** 0.050*** 0.042*** 
  [0.015] [0.015] [0.016] [0.015] [0.015] [0.015] 
  
Type of settlement: Moscow 0.152* 0.121 0.138 0.153* 0.152* 0.146* 
 [0.086] [0.085] [0.086] [0.088] [0.086] [0.086] 
-0.028 -0.036 -0.028 -0.036 -0.028 -0.029 Type of settlement: regional 
capital [0.032] [0.031] [0.032] [0.032] [0.032] [0.032] 
0.079 0.094 0.076 0.096 0.079 0.076 Type of settlement: urban village 
[0.063] [0.064] [0.063] [0.064] [0.063] [0.062] 
0.031 0.035 0.029 0.027 0.032 0.028 Investment potential of the region 
(low) [0.033] [0.033] [0.034] [0.033] [0.033] [0.033] 
-0.178*** -0.175*** -0.179*** -0.190*** -0.178*** -0.180*** Investment potential of the region 
(high) [0.035] [0.035] [0.036] [0.034] [0.035] [0.035] 
  
0.105 0.114 0.133 0.12 0.105 0.101 (some) government ownership  
[0.078] [0.079] [0.083] [0.081] [0.078] [0.078] 
0.060 0.058 0.051 0.055 0.060 0.049 (some) foreign ownership  
[0.059] [0.059] [0.059] [0.060] [0.059] [0.059] 
0.128 0.155* 0.142 0.155* 0.127 0.143* Unitary enterprises 
[0.082] [0.084] [0.087] [0.084] [0.082] [0.084] 
0.089** 0.090** 0.118** 0.093** 0.089** 0.092** No response to ownership question 
[0.043] [0.044] [0.047] [0.043] [0.043] [0.043] 
Holding group (parent company) 0.155* 0.138 0.159* 0.138 0.155* 0.151* 
 [0.089] [0.088] [0.091] [0.089] [0.089] [0.089] 
Holding group (subsidiary) 0.001 -0.010 0.0004 0.004 0.001 0.003 
 [0.034] [0.034] [0.034] [0.034] [0.034] [0.034] 
  
-0.028 -0.034 -0.034 -0.033 -0.028 -0.030 Time of foundation: 1992-1998 
[0.042] [0.042] [0.042] [0.041] [0.042] [0.042] 
-0.087** -0.088** -0.086** -0.081* -0.087** -0.091** Time of foundation: since 1999 
[0.042] [0.042] [0.043] [0.043] [0.042] [0.042] 
  
  0.086**         Management quality (medium) 
  [0.034]         
  0.141***         Management quality (high) 
  [0.049]         
    0.056***       Active in innovations 
     [0.018]       
      0.118***     Investment Activity Index 
      [0.038]     
        -0.005   ISO certification 
          [0.031]   
Exporter dummy           0.048 
            [0.032] 
12/07/2011 
Sector Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sample size 951 951 927 951 951 951 
 
 
Table 8a. Determinants of receipt of support from local authorities 
  Support from local authorities (dummy) 
BA membership 0.074** 0.066** 0.071** 0.071** 0.073** 0.074** 
  [0.029] [0.029] [0.029] [0.029] [0.029] [0.029] 
0.080*** 0.075*** 0.083*** 0.077*** 0.080*** 0.081*** Assistance to regional and local 
authorities (dummy) [0.029] [0.029] [0.029] [0.029] [0.029] [0.029] 
Log employees 0.006 -0.002 0.004 0.001 0.004 0.008 
  [0.013] [0.013] [0.013] [0.013] [0.013] [0.013] 
  
Type of settlement: Moscow 0.053 0.035 0.049 0.051 0.053 0.055 
 [0.071] [0.069] [0.071] [0.071] [0.071] [0.072] 
-0.005 -0.009 -0.007 -0.009 -0.005 -0.004 Type of settlement: regional 
capital [0.028] [0.028] [0.028] [0.028] [0.028] [0.028] 
0.012 0.019 0.007 0.016 0.012 0.013 Type of settlement: urban 
village [0.053] [0.054] [0.052] [0.054] [0.053] [0.053] 
-0.051* -0.048* -0.054* -0.052* -0.053* -0.050* Investment potential of the 
region (low) [0.029] [0.029] [0.029] [0.029] [0.029] [0.029] 
-0.134*** -0.130*** -0.132*** -0.137*** -0.135*** -0.134*** Investment potential of the 
region (high) [0.030] [0.031] [0.031] [0.030] [0.030] [0.030] 
  
0.004 0.005 0.014 0.008 0.004 0.005 (some) government ownership  
[0.060] [0.060] [0.062] [0.061] [0.060] [0.060] 
0.128** 0.126** 0.125** 0.127** 0.129** 0.133** (some) foreign ownership  
[0.058] [0.058] [0.058] [0.058] [0.058] [0.058] 
0.208** 0.225*** 0.205** 0.219*** 0.210** 0.202** Unitary enterprises 
[0.084] [0.085] [0.086] [0.085] [0.085] [0.084] 
0.094** 0.094** 0.111*** 0.096** 0.094** 0.093** No response to ownership 
question [0.040] [0.040] [0.043] [0.040] [0.040] [0.040] 
0.049 0.039 0.053 0.044 0.048 0.051 Holding group (parent 
company) [0.068] [0.065] [0.070] [0.067] [0.068] [0.068] 
Holding group (subsidiary) 0.018 0.010 0.023 0.020 0.017 0.017 
 [0.031] [0.030] [0.031] [0.031] [0.031] [0.031] 
  
-0.019 -0.020 -0.016 -0.020 -0.019 -0.018 Time of foundation: 1992-1998 
[0.035] [0.035] [0.036] [0.035] [0.035] [0.035] 
-0.053 -0.052 -0.050 -0.050 -0.052 -0.052 Time of foundation: since 1999 
[0.039] [0.039] [0.040] [0.040] [0.039] [0.039] 
  
  0.035         Management quality (medium) 
  [0.031]         
  0.082*         Management quality (high) 
  [0.042]         
    0.015       Active in innovations 
     [0.016]       
      0.041     Investment Activity Index 
      [0.032]     
        0.013   ISO certification 
          [0.028]   
Exporter dummy           -0.016 
            [0.029] 
Sector Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sample size 950 950 926 950 950 950 
12/07/2011 
 
12/07/2011 
Table 8b. Determinants of receipt of support from local authorities 
 Support from local authorities (dummy) 
Sector-specific BA 0.091** 0.088** 0.088** 0.086** 0.090** 0.091** 
  [0.039] [0.039] [0.039] [0.039] [0.039] [0.039] 
Regional BA 0.075* 0.068 0.076* 0.073* 0.074* 0.074* 
  [0.043] [0.042] [0.043] [0.043] [0.042] [0.043] 
0.151** 0.138* 0.150** 0.143* 0.150** 0.150** RSPP, OPORA, Delovaya 
Rossia [0.073] [0.072] [0.073] [0.073] [0.073] [0.073] 
TPP -0.049 -0.058 -0.051 -0.048 -0.049 -0.049 
  [0.043] [0.041] [0.042] [0.043] [0.043] [0.043] 
0.080*** 0.074** 0.082*** 0.077*** 0.079*** 0.080*** Assistance to regional and 
local authorities (dummy) [0.029] [0.029] [0.029] [0.029] [0.029] [0.029] 
Log employees 0.004 -0.003 0.003 0.001 0.003 0.006 
 [0.013] [0.013] [0.013] [0.013] [0.013] [0.013] 
  
Type of settlement: Moscow 0.044 0.026 0.040 0.043 0.044 0.045 
 [0.070] [0.067] [0.070] [0.070] [0.070] [0.070] 
-0.008 -0.012 -0.011 -0.011 -0.008 -0.008 Type of settlement: regional 
capital [0.028] [0.028] [0.029] [0.028] [0.028] [0.028] 
0.013 0.022 0.008 0.016 0.013 0.014 Type of settlement: urban 
village [0.053] [0.054] [0.052] [0.054] [0.053] [0.053] 
-0.051* -0.048* -0.054* -0.052* -0.053* -0.050* Investment potential of the 
region (low) [0.029] [0.029] [0.029] [0.029] [0.029] [0.029] 
-0.130*** -0.126*** -0.128*** -0.133*** -0.131*** -0.130*** Investment potential of the 
region (high) [0.031] [0.031] [0.031] [0.031] [0.031] [0.031] 
  
0.001 0.002 0.011 0.004 0.001 0.002 (some) government ownership  
[0.059] [0.059] [0.062] [0.060] [0.060] [0.060] 
0.128** 0.127** 0.124** 0.127** 0.128** 0.132** (some) foreign ownership  
[0.058] [0.058] [0.058] [0.058] [0.058] [0.059] 
0.206** 0.224*** 0.204** 0.216** 0.208** 0.201** Unitary enterprises 
[0.085] [0.086] [0.086] [0.085] [0.085] [0.085] 
0.099** 0.099** 0.117*** 0.100** 0.099** 0.098** No response to ownership 
question [0.041] [0.041] [0.043] [0.041] [0.041] [0.041] 
0.048 0.036 0.051 0.044 0.047 0.049 Holding group (parent 
company) [0.067] [0.064] [0.069] [0.067] [0.067] [0.068] 
Holding group (subsidiary) 0.019 0.010 0.024 0.020 0.018 0.018 
 [0.031] [0.030] [0.031] [0.031] [0.031] [0.031] 
  
-0.014 -0.016 -0.012 -0.015 -0.014 -0.014 Time of foundation: 1992-
1998 [0.036] [0.036] [0.036] [0.036] [0.036] [0.036] 
-0.050 -0.049 -0.047 -0.048 -0.050 -0.049 Time of foundation: since 
1999 [0.039] [0.039] [0.040] [0.040] [0.039] [0.040] 
  
  0.034         Management quality (medium) 
  [0.031]         
  0.084**         Management quality (high) 
  [0.043]         
    0.016       Active in innovations 
     [0.016]       
      0.033     Investment Activity Index 
      [0.032]     
        0.012   ISO certification 
          [0.028]   
Exporter dummy           -0.014 
            [0.029] 
12/07/2011 
Sector Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sample size 950 950 926 950 950 950 
 
 
